The problem of finding a largest stable matching where preference lists may include ties and unacceptable partners (MAX SMTI) is known to be NP-hard. It cannot be approximated within 33/29 (> 1.1379) unless P=NP, and the current best approximation algorithm achieves the ratio of 1.5. MAX SMTI remains NP-hard even when preference lists of one side do not contain ties, and it cannot be approximated within 21/19 (> 1.1052) unless P=NP. However, even under this restriction, the best known approximation ratio is still 1.5. In this paper, we improve it to 25/17 (< 1.4706).
Introduction
The stable marriage problem [3, 5] is a classical bipartite matching problem. In its original setting, an instance consists of n men, n women, and each person's preference list, where a preference list is a totally ordered list of all the members of the opposite sex according to his/her preference. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs each consisting of a man and a woman. For a matching M , a pair of a man m and a woman w is called a blocking pair if both prefer each other to their current partners. A matching with no blocking pair is called stable. Gale and Shapley [3] showed that every instance admits at least one stable matching, and proposed an O(n 2 )-time algorithm, known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, to find one.
There are several examples of using the stable marriage problem in assignment systems, including residents/hospitals matching [5, 19] , students/schools matching [1, 2, 22] , etc. Clearly, the restrictions that each preference list must be strict (i.e., it is a totally ordered list) and complete (i.e., it includes all the members of the opposite side) are unrealistic for such applications. Two natural relaxations are then to allow for ties and incompleteness. (There are three definitions of stability when ties are allowed [5, 8] . In this paper, we consider weak stability, which is the most natural notion among the three.) Applying either one or both of these extensions does not affect the validity of the properties that a stable matching exists for any instance and that one can be found in polynomial time. Hence a stable matching can be found efficiently even with these extensions.
However, if one is concerned with the size of stable matchings, the situation changes significantly. In the original setting and an extension with only ties, a stable matching is a perfect matching by definition. In an extension with only incomplete preference lists, a stable matching may no longer be perfect but for a fixed instance, all of the stable matchings have the same size due to the famous Rural Hospitals Theorem [4] . Thus the problem of finding a largest stable matching is solvable in polynomial time for all of these cases. In contrast, if we allow both extensions, one instance can have stable matchings of different sizes, and hence the problem of finding a largest stable matching (which we call hereafter MAX SMTI (MAXimum Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete lists)) is no longer trivial. In fact, this problem was shown to be NP-hard [11, 17] . Since a stable matching is a maximal matching, any two stable matchings differ in size by at most a factor of two. Hence, constructing a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm is easy.
There has been a sequence of improvements of the 2-approximation ratio. The first attempt was made by using a local search type algorithm, which successively increases the size of a stable matching at each iteration [12, 13] , but these upper bounds approach 2 as n goes to infinity. The first upper bound strictly better than 2 was obtained along this line. Iwama et al. [14] obtained an upper bound of 1.875 by modifying the aforementioned local search. Later, Király [15] improved it to 5/3 by using a completely different idea. His algorithm is a modification of the Gale-Shapley algorithm so that each man may propose to the same woman more than once, and the roles of men and women are exchanged during the execution. McDermid [18] improved Király's algorithm by exploiting a classical result in graph theory, the GallaiEdmonds decomposition, and obtained an upper bound of 1.5, which is the current best approximation ratio. Meanwhile, the best-known lower bound is 33/29 (> 1.1379) under the assumption that P̸ =NP [23] .
For a given instance, let M opt be a largest stable matching and M be any stable matching. Consider a union of M opt and M , which can be seen as a bipartite graph. Each connected component is an alternating path or cycle. If every connected component is a path of length three that contains two M optedges and one M -edge, then |M opt | = 2|M |, which is the worst possible case mentioned above. All of the above approximation algorithms were designed to exclude as many such length-three paths as possible. The ratio of 1.875 [14] was achieved by excluding a constant fraction (relative to the size of M ) of such components. And in [15] , beyond his 5/3 result, Király was also able to remove all such length-three paths (which led to the approximation ratio of 1.5) if the instance has ties on only one side, which is another main result of that paper. As an extension, McDermid [18] finally succeeded in excluding them completely for general instances.
A natural extension of this line of research is to attack augmenting paths of length five. In order to break the bound of 1.5, we need to remove those paths at least by a constant fraction. This is apparently a challenging goal for general instances. Even if ties are on only one side, Király stated in Conjecture 3 in [15] that breaking the 1.5-approximation implies something "surprising," that is, breaking the 1.5-approximation upper bound of MAX SMTI with onesided ties implies breaking the 3-approximation upper bound of the minimum vertex cover problem in 3-uniform hyper-graphs (which disproves the Unique Games Conjecture (UGC) [16] ).
Our Contributions. In this paper, we improve the approximation ratio from 1.5 to 25/17 (< 1.4706) for instances with one-sided ties, which disproves Király's conjecture under UGC. We note that this approximation ratio also holds for the hospitals/residents problem (i.e., many-one variant) with onesided ties (see [9] for the relationship between approximability of the stable marriage problem and the hospitals/residents problem).
The basic idea is to use an integer program (IP) and its linear program (LP) relaxation, which is summarized as follows: note that the Gale-Shapley algorithm (GS) consists of a sequence of proposals from men to women (see [5] for details). Király's algorithm, GSA1, is similar to GS, but is different in that each man goes through his list twice for proposals. In GSA1, each man has one of two possible states, "unpromoted" or "promoted" (these terms are taken from McDermid's paper [18] ). Each man is initially unpromoted, and once he has proposed to all of the women on his list, he becomes promoted and starts again by making proposals from the top of the list. When a woman receives proposals from two men with the same preference but different states, she always selects the promoted one. It should be more powerful to use not only two different states, unpromoted and promoted, but more quantitative information for the same purpose. Our new idea is to formulate MAX SMTI as an IP by generalizing the IP formulation for the original stable marriage problem [20, 21] , and then to solve its LP relaxation (in polynomial time). We use this optimal solution to define the state of each man.
Finally, we briefly discuss the limits of our approach using the integrality gap of our IP formulation.
Related Results. As mentioned above, general MAX SMTI is approximable within 1.5, but cannot be approximated with a ratio smaller than 33/29 (> 1.1379) unless P=NP and smaller than 4/3 (> 1.3333) under UGC [23] . If the length of each man's list is bounded by 2, it is solvable in polynomial time even if women's lists are of arbitrary length, while it is NP-hard even if the length of each preference list is bounded by 3 [10] . The only known approximability result with a ratio smaller than 1.5 is a randomized approximation algorithm that achieves an expected approximation ratio of 10/7 (< 1.4286) for the special case that ties appear on one side only and the length of each tie is at most two [6] .
The restriction for MAX SMTI that ties appear in preference lists of one sex only is quite natural in practice. For example, it is reported that in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS), a hospitals/residents matching system in Scotland, residents are required to submit strictly ordered preference lists while each hospital's list may contain one tie [9] . Even under this restriction, MAX SMTI remains NP-hard and is not approximable with a ratio smaller than 21/19 (> 1.1052) unless P=NP, and smaller than 5/4 under UGC [7] . In this restricted setting, Irving and Manlove [9] presented a 5/3-approximation algorithm. Király [15] improved it to 1.5, which is the previous best upper bound as well as the McDermid bound [18] for the general case.
Preliminaries
An instance I of MAX SMTI comprises n men, n women and each person's preference list that may be incomplete and may include ties. If a person p includes a person q (of the opposite sex) in p's preference list, we say that q is acceptable to p. Without loss of generality, we assume that m is acceptable to The approximation ratio of an approximation algorithm T is max{opt(I)/ T (I)} over all instances I, where opt(I) and T (I) are the sizes of the optimal and the algorithm's solutions, respectively.
The following IP formulation of MAX SMTI instance I, denoted by IP (I), is a generalization of the one for the original stable marriage problem given in [20, 21] . For each (man, woman) pair (m, w), we introduce a variable x m,w .
Maximize:
Subject to: 
Approximation Algorithm
In the following, we assume that the men's lists are strict and the women's lists may contain ties. Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo-code for our algorithm GSA-LP. We use a variable f (m), which assigns a non-negative value to each man m. The value of f (m) is initially set to zero but increases as the algorithm proceeds. We also use another variable p(m), which stores the current position for m in his preference list. When man m proposes to woman w, w accepts this If m has proposed to all of the women in his list and he is still single, then the value of f (m) is set to 2 (Lines 8-9) and m goes to the second round. In the second round, the value of f (m) does not change and m sends a sequence of proposals from top of his list again. If m is still single after finishing this sequence, then f (m) is increased by 1 (namely, f (m) is set to 3) (Lines 10-11) and m restarts another sequence of proposals again (the third round). If m is still single after the third round, f (m) is set to 4 and hereafter m sends no more proposals. Note that not every man goes into the third round, but if a man enters the third round, then it is guaranteed that his second round is completed.
Note that just before m first proposes to w in his first round, he has proposed to all of the preceding women with the value f (m) = 
The following instance I 1 , presented in [15] , is a worst-case instance for both the Király [15] 
Here, when two or more men are in the same parenthesis in a woman w's preference list, it means that they are tied in w's list. In the current example, m 2 and m 3 are tied in w 2 's list. The optimal solution of
}, but these two algorithms may output a stable matching M = {(m 2 , w 1 ), (m 3 , w 2 )}. During the execution of these algorithms, w 2 receives proposals from both m 2 and m 3 . To obtain M opt , we want to make w 2 choose m 2 rather than m 3 , so that m 3 proposes to w 3 . But in these algorithms, there are executions in which w 2 chooses m 3 (depending on the order of the proposals). In contrast, our algorithm GSA-LP always obtains the optimal solution. The LP relaxation LP (I 1 ) has the following (unique) optimal solution x * .
• in
an alternating cycle. In this paper, we refer to a path of length three starting from and ending with M opt -edges as an augmenting three-path (see Fig. 1(a) ). We can prove Proposition 1 by following a similar analysis to Király's GSA1 [15] .
Proposition 1 There is no augmenting three-path in G.
Proof Let S be the set of men and women who are single in M . Also, let us partition M into P , Q, and R using the graph G: Consider a path of length five starting from and ending with M opt -edges, which we will refer to as an augmenting five-path hereafter. (See Fig. 1(b) . The preference structure shown here will be established later by Lemma 5.) Let m s , w p , m p , w q , m q , and w s be the men and the women on this path appearing in this order, that is, both m s and w s are in S, and
, and w s = M opt (m q ). Let P be the set of pairs (m p , w p ) and Q be the set of pairs (m q , w q ) on all the augmenting five-paths. Let R = M \(P ∪Q).
Note that G does not contain a path of length one (i.e., an isolated edge) as a connected component, because if such a path (e.g., an M opt -edge (m, w)) exists, then (m, w) is a blocking pair for M . Graph G does not contain any augmenting three-path by Proposition 1. An augmenting five-path contains one edge from each of P and Q, and three M opt -edges. Hence the total number of M opt -edges contained in augmenting five-paths is exactly |R|. However this guarantees only the ratio of 1.5 when |R| = 0, which is exactly the worst-case example for Király's GSA1 [15] .
The advantage of our new algorithm is that it allows us to apply another formula to bound |M opt |, in the following way: Recall that x * i,j is the value of x i,j for the optimal solution x * of LP (I). Note that if x * m,w > 0 for m, w ∈ S, then (m, w) ∈ A by Constraint (4) of LP (I), so (m, w) is a blocking pair for M , a contradiction. Hence ∑ i,j∈S x * i,j = 0. Now, let us define the value x * (X) for a subset X ⊆ M as:
It is not hard to see that
Hence the optimal value of the objective function of LP (I) can be written as (x * (P ) + x * (Q) + x * (R))/2 and we have that
We will later prove the following key lemma.
Lemma 2 x
Hence we have that |M opt | ≤ Then we can show the following two lemmas, whose proofs will be given later.
Lemma 3 x
* (P ) + x * (Q) + x * (R) ≤ 2|P | + 2|Q| + 6|R| + 4α + 4β.
Lemma 4 x
Using these two lemmas, we prove Lemma 2.
Proof By multiplying the inequality of Lemma 4 by four and then adding to the inequality of Lemma 3, we obtain this lemma.
⊓ ⊔
The rest of this section is devoted to the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4. In Sec. 4.3, we give some properties of P , Q, R, and the optimal LP solution. In Sec. 4.4, we give upper bounds on x * (P ), x * (Q), and x * (R). Finally we prove Lemma 3 in Sec. 4.5 and Lemma 4 in Sec. 4.6.
Properties of P , Q, R, and LP Solution
We first show several basic properties that will be used later. Lemma 6 is especially important since it makes a difference between our new algorithm and Király's. Suppose that f (m p ) > 1. Then m p must have proposed to w p in the second round and hence also to w q (recall that w q ≻ mp w p ) with this f value. But this contradicts the fact that m p = wq m q and w q selected m q whose f value ≤ 1, which completes the proof of (v).
Lemma 5 Consider an augmenting five-path in graph

) ∈ Q). Then the following (i) -(v) hold:
⊓ ⊔ Next, we prove several equations: The first ones are ∑ j≻mw,j∈S x * m,j = 0 and
For the left equation, suppose that there is a woman j such that j ∈ S and j ≻ m w. Then woman j must include m in her list. Hence (m, j) blocks M , which contradicts the stability of M . The right equation can also be validated in a similar way. The next equation is ∑ i=wm,i∈S
Suppose that there exists a man i such that i = w m and i ∈ S. Then man i must include w in his list. Since i ∈ S, i should have proposed to w with f (i) = 3. This contradicts the fact that w selected m whose f value is at most 1 by Lemma 5(v). Thus this equation holds.
Lemma 6 ∑
Proof Consider an augmenting five-path of Fig. 1(b) . Note that both m p and m q obtained their partners in the first round (by Lemma 5(v)). Let f (m q ) be the final f -value of m q , and f ′ (m p ) and f ′ (m q ) be the maximum f -values of m p and m q respectively, when they proposed to w q (note that they may propose to w q several times). Then it turns out that ∑
for the reasons given shortly. Note that the lemma is proved if we add this inequality for all augmenting five-paths. Now, here are reasons for the validity of the above inequalities. (i) The first equality is due to Equation (6) . (ii) The first inequality is the key fact obtained from our new algorithm: When m p proposes to w p for the first time, the f -value must be at least By the definition of x * (X) and Constraints (1) and (2), we have
and similarly we also have
and
To prove Lemmas 7 and 8, we use the following inequality, which is immediate from Constraints (1), (2), and (3) of LP (I):
Lemma 7
Proof By the definition of x * (P ) and Constraints (1) and (2) of LP (I),
(by Equations (6) and (7))
Proof First, let us define s m,w for (m, w) ∈ R as:
Next, partition R into R + and R 0 such that
Since s m,w > 0, there exists a man i ∈ S such that i = w m. Since i is single in M , f (i) = 3 when i made the last proposal to w, and hence f (m) ≥ f (i) = 3 at the termination of the algorithm. Hence, during the execution of GSA-LP, m must have proposed to all the women in his list. Therefore, all of the women in his list are matched in M , and thus we have the following inequality (a):
Next, let us consider (m, w) ∈ R 0 . By noting that men do not have ties, we have the following inequality (b):
(by Equation (6) and s m,w = 0)
Finally, by inequalities (a) and (b), we have x
Proof of Lemma 3
Here, we define some more quantities to simplify later expressions: Then, we show the following useful lemma.
Proof It is easy to see that
where the second equality is from Equation (6) (6) and (7), which contradicts (c). i,w appears in the first, the second, and the third terms, respectively, of the righthand side. ⊓ ⊔ It is not hard to see that p m + q m + r m = p w + q w + r w and π ≤ p m by definition and π ≤ β ≤ q m by Lemma 6. Then, the following inequality is immediate by Inequalities (8), (9) , and (10). Proof Consider an augmenting five-path of Fig. 1(b where the equality is from m p = wq m q (Lemma 5(iv)) and the inequality is from Constraint (3) of LP (I) (note that (m p , w q ) ∈ A). By summing up this inequality for all of the augmenting five-paths, we obtain this lemma.
⊓ ⊔
By Lemma 5(iii), we have M opt (m) ≻ m w for (m, w) ∈ P . Therefore, by using Equations (6) and (7), Lemma 10 can be written as:
Then the following inequality follows from Lemmas 7 and 8, and Inequality (9). (by Corollary 1)
Integrality Gaps
In this section, we consider the limitation of our method. In Sec. 5.1, we show that the integrality gap between our IP formulation and LP relaxation is at least 1 + 1 e (> 1.3678). This does not immediately imply a lower bound of GSA-LP, but may be considered as some barometer to show its limit. Also, in Sec. 5.2, we use a similar approach to show that the integrality gap is at least 1.5 − o(1) if we use the same IP formulation for the general MAX SMTI (i.e., ties on both sides). Therefore, generalizing Király's GSA2 [15] (Király's 5/3-approximation algorithm for the general MAX SMTI) or McDermid's algorithm [18] using an optimal LP solution seems difficult unless a fundamentally new idea is introduced.
One-Sided Ties
Consider the following instance I 2 of MAX SMTI. The value of the objective function for x is
Hence the integrality gap is
This value approaches 1 + 1 e (> 1.3678) as k goes to infinity.
